This paper is about structural change within European Manufacturing since 1985, thereby covering the key period in the ongoing processes of European integration and world wide globalisation. It focuses on whether the Member States are becoming more specialised in their industrial structures, and, if so, whether this means that industries are also becoming more geographically concentrated within the European Union. Perhaps counter-intuitively, we find that, although specialisation has indeed increased, concentration has moved in the opposite direction. In order to explain this, we derive a formal relationship between the two concepts which shows how increasing industrial specialisation has been offset by faster growth by the smaller Member States, with the net effect that industries have become somewhat less geographically concentrated. We suggest one potential theoretical explanation by drawing upon recent work by Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) 
Introduction
European manufacturing has been and is currently facing dramatic changes in its business environment. The process of European integration has abolished trade barriers, created a single market and now a single currency. Meanwhile, globalisation has widened the horizons for production, consumption and competition and accelerated the diffusion of knowledge, information and technology. It has also increased the world-wide impact of national and regional economic and political shocks. New technologies, based in telecom, electronics and biotechnology, are changing production patterns and consumer choices.
Against this backcloth, this paper is about structural change within European Manufacturing over the last 15 years. In particular, it focuses on whether the Member States are becoming more specialised in their industrial structures, and, if so, whether this means that industries are also becoming more geographically concentrated. En passant, it also establishes a formal relationship between industrial specialisation and geographical concentration, and this may be of more general methodological interest beyond the specific case considered in this paper.
These two aspects of structure have policy significance for various reasons. Exploitation of scale economies and deeper division of labour were expected to be the driving forces of Europe's increased competitiveness flowing from the Single Market Programme; and, given differences in factor endowments, one would expect this to lead to increasing specialisation. However, this raises the concern that over-specialisation of individual countries might render them overexposed to "asymmetric shocks", thereby endangering stability within the common currency area. There is also the concern that integration might lead to an over-agglomeration of activities in a preferred "core", at the expense of a disadvantaged periphery.
Turning briefly to previous related literature 2 , traditional trade theory, new trade theory and economic geography each yields some insights, although, taken together, they do not provide unambiguous predictions that specialisation and concentration will inevitably increase as a result of integration, especially over the long-run. Nevertheless, comparing the regional structures of Europe and the USA, one might anticipate the potential for dramatic change: regions are far more specialised in the USA (Krugman, 1991) , and some economists have forecast that similar levels of regional concentration will emerge in Europe following the creation of a single Market.
The rest of the paper is organised in five sections. Section 1 briefly describes our data base. Section 2 uses the Entropy index to derive a formal relationship between specialisation and concentration. Section 3 estimates this relationship and presents our main finding: countries have 1 The ideas in this paper were developed whilst we were working together on a contribution to The Competitiveness of European Industry (European Commission, 1999) . Thanks are due to the Commission for bringing us together, to Dagmar Guttmann, Traude Novak and Eva Sokoll for research assistance. become more specialised, but industries have tended to become less geographically concentrated. We explain this seemingly paradoxical result statistically in terms of the Entropy indices, then heuristically showing which industries and countries are behind the trend, and then theoretically (in section 4) in terms of a model of Fujita, Krugman, Venables. Section 5 summarises.
Data
Our paper focuses exclusively on European manufacturing; the unit of observation is the individual three-digit industry, of which there are 99 3 . The variable used to measure "size" is production, defined as nominal value added 4 . The European Union is defined as the 14 (Belgium and Luxembourg are consolidated) members in 1998; the activity of the countries which joined in 1995 is included for the whole period. The period analysed is 1985 to 1998. 1985 is selected as a starting point which is sufficiently in advance of the enactment of the single market in 1992; 1998 was the most recent year for which comprehensive data were available. Fortunately, these two years are not particularly extreme points in the business cycle. In the middle of the period, Europe faced a severe recession with devaluations in some member countries. Additional country specific shocks during these years were the unification of Germany, the transition of the Central and Eastern European Countries, and political turmoil in the Balkan region. Each of these shocks affected member countries differently and technically speaking increased the noise in the data set.
Measuring Specialisation and Concentration using the Entropy Index
There are many standard statistical indices of dispersion which might be employed to measure these two concepts. Here, we shall employ the entropy index, largely for its desirable decomposition properties.
Notation and definitions

Let
X ij = output of industry i in country j, i=1…..n; j=1……k Σ i X ij = X j = total output of all industries in country j Σ j X ij = X i = total EU output (i.e. for all countries) in industry i X = Σ i X j = Σ j X i = aggregate EU output in manufacturing Specialisation is the extent to which a given country specialises its activities in a small number of industries: we talk of the production structure of a country being "highly specialised" if only a few industries account for a large share of its total production. A traditional example in the EU context might be the Nordic countries, which were highly specialised in timber, pulp and paper.
For a given country, j, the Entropy index of specialisation is defined by the summation of the products of the shares and log shares of each industry in the country's aggregate manufacturing:
Note that, if the country has equal sized operations in all n industries, (X ij /X j ) = 1/n for all i, and SPEC = ln (n). Alternatively, if it is completely specialised in just one industry, SPEC = ln 1 = 0. More generally, SPEC increases, the more evenly the country spreads its activities across the n industries; it is therefore an inverse measure of specialisation.
Sometimes it is convenient to use the numbers equivalent form of the index. This is its antilog, and will be denoted by NSPEC j. This effectively converts the country's actual distribution of industry shares into an hypothetical equivalent number of equal sized industries: its bounds are 1 and n.
Geographic concentration 5 is defined as the extent to which EU activity in a given industry is concentrated in just a few member states. Again, pulp and paper would be a good example: this industry is concentrated in a few countries; and similarly pasta. For a given industry i, in the EU as a whole, the Entropy is defined analogously to the above. In this case, the shares refer to each country's share of EU aggregate output for that industry (X ij /X i ).
Analogously to SPEC, CONC must lie between ln(k) and 0, corresponding to equal dispersion and total concentration respectively. The numbers equivalent, NCONC, is the antilog of CONC.
'Typical' levels of specialisation and concentration
In what follows, we shall want to refer to 'typical', or average, levels of specialisation of countries and concentration of industries. These are defined as weighted averages, with the weights being, respectively, the country and industry shares of EU aggregate manufacturing:
where w j = X j / X and v i = X i / X
Substituting (1) and (2), along with (5), into (3) and (4) gives:
The relationship between concentration and specialisation
5 The term "concentration" is used in this paper to indicate the geographical distribution of an industry across the member states and should not be confused with the notion of seller concentration used in Industrial Organisation.
At an intuitive level, one can see that concentration and specialisation will be closely related. Indeed, at first sight, they might almost seem to be two sides of the same coin. For example, suppose that each country becomes more specialised, concentrating more of its activity in those industries in which it is comparatively larger, and less in those in which it is comparatively smaller. In a world where all countries were of the same size, and likewise all industries, such increased specialisation must mean that industries will also become more concentrated -because the larger players would become larger, and the smaller players smaller.
To put the same point statistically, specialisation and concentration are two perspectives to be derived from a matrix with the columns referring to countries, and the rows to industries. Specialisation is observed by reading down each column, whilst concentration is observed by reading along each row. One might expect that if "inequalities" tend to increase down the columns, so they should also increase along the rows. We now explore this intuition, first in the a hypothetical symmetric case, and then allowing for asymmetries.
The symmetric case
Suppose all countries were equal sized, and that all industries were equal sized: X j = X/k for all j, and X i = X/n for all i.
Substituting into (6) and into (7) yields:
Thus, both indices depend identically on the overall entropy (the first RHS term, which reflects overall inequalities across rows and columns). So, in a symmetric world (with fixed n and k), any change over time in typical specialisation will be identical to the change in typical concentration.
The asymmetric case
Leaving aside the symmetric case, the two indices may be re-expressed more generally as:
In this general case, the second terms in the two equations are also entropies, and they both have natural interpretations. In (10), this is the entropy of aggregate country sizes, and we refer to this as the geographical concentration of EU manufacturing as a whole -EUCONC. In (11), it is the entropy of industry sizes for the EU as a single entity, and we refer to this as the industrial specialisation of the EU -EUSPEC. Combining (10) and (11) provides the desired formal relationship between typical specialisation and concentration:
Recalling that the antilog of an Entropy is its numbers equivalent, these last two terms can be interpreted, respectively, as the logs of the equivalent numbers of countries and industries. Thus, (10) and (11) are obvious generalisations of (8) and (9), with actual numbers being replaced by numbers equivalents.
So, in an asymmetric world, it remains the case that any change over time in typical specialisation will exactly mirror the change in typical concentration -but only so long as the equivalent numbers of countries and industries remain unchanged. Where this condition is not fulfilled, average specialisation of countries (TYPSPEC) and average concentration of industries (TYPCONC) can follow different paths. Table 1 reports the results of estimating the identity (12) for each year between 1985 and 1998. It also shows the numbers equivalents (in which case, the identity becomes multiplicative.) 
Results
Source: EUROSTAT (SBS)
Changes 1985-1998 Focusing first merely on the changes over the period as a whole, Table 1 shows that:
• Typically, member states became more specialised: TYPSPEC declined from 4.071 to 4.011, that is, the hypothetical equivalent number of identical industries declined from 58.6 to 55.2. Since entropy is an inverse indicator, this means specialisation increased in most countries. Although the magnitude of the change seems relatively small, it is both significant and pervasive 6 .
• On the other hand, typically, industries became geographically less concentrated: TYPCONC increased from 1.966 to 1.991; that is, the equivalent number of equal sized countries rose from 7.15 to 7.32. This result -a decrease in geographical concentration -is also significant at the 5% level (t value = 2.25).
Superficially, this combination of increased specialisation and declining concentration is surprising, and even counter-intuitive. As we have just shown, it would be impossible in a world where the (equivalent) numbers of countries and industries are both fixed over time. The explanation is, of course, that the two other components in identity (12) did not remain constant.
In fact, the (equivalent) number of countries increased from 8.05 to 8.35, whilst the (equivalent) number of industries decreased from 66 to 63. Both factors pulled in the same direction in allowing typical concentration to decline, in spite of increasing specialisation. In turn, the interpretation of these changes lies with differential growth rates of countries and industries. A decrease in an entropy numbers equivalent indicates increasing inequalities, and so the implication here must be that, at the EU level, the larger industries have tended to grow more rapidly than the smaller industries, whilst the smaller member states have tended to grow more rapidly than the larger member states. This is indeed confirmed in Table 2 (at this point, just the comparison between 1985 and 1998), which shows that, the ten largest industries increased their share of EU aggregate manufacturing production from 30.9% to 35.2%; and the combined share of small countries within the EU increased from 19.1% to 20.3%. 
Changes within the time period
Closer inspection of the individual time series within Table 1 reveals that neither typical concentration nor specialisation followed steady monotonic paths over the whole of this period. In the case of TYPSPEC, there was certainly a prevailing tendency for year-on-year declines, but this was interrupted by quite sharp increases in 1990 and 1991. TYPCONC, on the other hand, showed no discernible trend, 1985-1992, but then increased steadily for most of the remainder of the period. This leads to an interesting pattern when the two variables are plotted against each other ( Figure 1 ). As can be seen, although the general trend was a move in the north-westerly direction, this was subject to a reversal between 1989 and 1991, giving rise to a distinctive 'loop' shape. In fact, the effect of the loop was to return TYPSPEC in 1991 to a magnitude almost identical to its 1985 starting point, and to leave TYPCONC slightly lower than its starting point. The reason for this loop was a combination of events. On the geographical side, there were the immediate effects of German reunification, and severe structural problems and devaluation in two of the smaller countries, Sweden and Finland. On the specialisation side, the motor vehicle industry, which increased its overall share in manufacturing by 1.5 % over the period as a whole, lost half a percentage point in this subperiod. Combined with a similar drastic decline in the large basic chemicals industry, this produced a temporary decline in the share of large industries, which, nevertheless, expanded their shares, both before and thereafter. 
Source: EUROSTAT (SBS).
In view of this short run disruption, we now explore the data in more detail for the two subperiods, 1985-92 and 1992-98 7 . As can be seen from the growth rates at the foot of Table 1 , this allows us to refine the two previous bullet point findings as follows:
• Typically, there was little net change in the specialisation of member states between 1985 and 1992: the number of equivalent industries in the typical member state declined only marginally from 58.6 to 58.1. But, 1992-98 saw a much larger fall from 58.1 to 55.2.
• Typically, industries became slightly more concentrated between 1985-92: NTYPCONC falling from 7.14 to 7.02. However, this was reversed, and easily outweighed, 1992-98, when the equivalent number of equal sized countries for the typical industry rose from 7.02 to 7.32.
Thus it becomes very clear that most of the net change in both specialisation and concentration occurred during the nineties, after the full introduction of the single market legislation -both variables changed by roughly 5% over just a 6 year period, 1992-98.
Returning to Table 2 , and now focussing on the figures for the two sub-periods, we see that the smaller member states actually lost ground between 1985 and 1992. This was most pronounced in larger industries, which were increasing their share of total manufacturing. However, since 1992, the smaller member states have increased their shares across the board -in large and small industries alike. Specific examples of significant inroads by small countries (decreasing concentration) include telecom industries, medical equipment, recorded media and computers, as well as basic chemicals and steel.
Explanation in terms of a model of economic geography
Thus, the data have shown that specialisation has increased and concentration decreased for the European Union between 1985 and 1998, and particularly since the beginning of the 1990s. Our decomposition has shown the mechanics behind this, and this has led us to some stylised facts concerning the divergence between large and small industries and between large and small countries. We now turn briefly to a specific strand of literature which might offer a potential explanation of these facts.
Economic geography provides various hypotheses about the causes of the clustering of industries and the dispersion of production across regions. Centripetal forces are forward and backward linkages, spillovers, economies of scale; while high transport costs, higher costs in the core are centrifugal forces, tending to foster dispersion. Fujita, Krugman, Venables (1999) provide a series of models in which the countervailing forces of concentration and dispersion are modelled. Here, we report the ingredients and main predictions of one of these models (FKV, 1999, p. 338 ff.), which yields predictions in line with our empirical results.
Their model refers to 3 countries (the outside world and two inside countries) and two industries. At high trade costs, there is a stable equilibrium in which one country (country 1) has a large share of population (activity) and it produces in both industries, while the smaller country has only the smaller part of the second industry 8 .
Given a reduction in external trade costs (i.e. the trade costs of the inside countries with the outside world) the larger inside country now loses population to the smaller (deconcentration) and at the same time the larger region becomes more specialised. The reason for the deconcentration of population is that exports (to the outside country) now make up a larger share of demand, so that backward linkages from consumer expenditure to production lose importance.
8 FKV call this concentration of population and dispersion of industries, insofar as the larger country has employment in both industries. At very high trade costs the smaller country produces in both industries too. More precisely: at high (but not prohibitive high) trade costs there exist two stable equilibria, each with concentration of population (output) in one of the two inside countries due to strong backward and forward linkages. The shares of the larger country and of the smaller country converges to 0.5 as the transport costs decline (see Figure 18 .3, p. 339) as shares of the second industry switch from the larger to the smaller country.
External demand is in equal distance to both regions. Two major advantages of the larger economy now become less important: proximity to demand, and inter industry linkages (since a larger share of the inputs is sourced from abroad). The larger region loses in general, specifically some part of industry 2 shifts to the smaller country. The smaller country remains completely specialised, but now with a higher share of industry 2 as well as of total output. Using FKV's (different) terminology (p. 340): "external trade liberalisation brings dispersion of population but concentration of industry". In our terms, 'dispersion of population' is equivalent to deconcentration, and 'concentration of industries' is equivalent to specialisation(!), so their model predicts, in our terminology, declining TYPSPEC and increasing TYPCONC.
We do not suggest that this particular model necessarily provides a complete answer to the facts unearthed in our paper. Of course, their predictions derive from a set of specific assumptions which may be more or less appropriate to our setting (a Dixit-Stiglitz utility function, iceberg type transport costs, specific cost functions including congestion costs, labour mobility between countries and between industries following a specific adjustment mechanism.) Similarly, their comparative static analysis of which equilibria can exist and which configurations are stable, may not map on easily to the 'real world' we have been confronted with here, in which a series of exogenous shocks may well have prevented any long period of equilibria. Furthermore the FKV model focuses on the impact of decreasing transport costs with the outside world only, while we believe European integration, as well as more general globalisation, have had fundamental impacts on the changing structure of Europe in the nineties.
Nevertheless it is interesting to note the relative importance of linkages as amongst the driving forces of their results. We have found empirically that there is persistently high specialisation of the larger countries in large industries, and this may be the result of increasing intra industry linkages in the large industries, which are already located in large countries. These may outweigh the somewhat decreasing importance of demand proximity. However, at the same time, the large countries have lost market share in general, and particularly in smaller industries. In these they were advantaged, initially, by closeness of demand and by their better ability to exploit economies of scale (relative to the importance of borders for small countries). But now the smaller countries are able to exploit their relative advantages, having lost their disadvantage in industries where economies of scale and/or complementary inputs are necessary. Thus, the smaller countries can increase shares in their favourite industries and in some new ones exploiting economies of scale (this effect is of course not included in the FKV model).
Summary
This paper investigates an important topic in the context of ongoing European integration. In general, it is accepted that restructuring and relocation will be necessary if productivity growth is to be increased, and if the full benefits from integration are to be exploited. Most policy makers also accept that this will mean increased specialisation, and that this might lead to increasing geographical concentration. In fact, our 'headline' results suggest that changes have been rather slow, and that geographic concentration has not risen at all, but, if anything, has decreased. On the other hand, there is evidence that the pace of change has quickened in the nineties, in which integration and globalisation should have had their strongest impact.
The most surprising feature of our results is that the trends for specialisation of countries and concentration of industries have moved in opposite directions. Since the former addresses whether a country increasingly specialises its activities in a small number of industries and the latter whether an industry produces in increasingly fewer countries, these might look like two sides of the same coin. If specialisation increases, one would expect that concentration would have to move in the same direction. However, this intuition is only correct if countries and industries are equal sized. To show this, we have derived an exact statistical relation between specialisation and concentration using the entropy index. This also reveals, conceptually, how it is possible for specialisation and concentration to move in opposite directions. In this particular case, this happens because, during recent years in Europe, larger industries have grown relatively to smaller industries, whilst smaller countries have grown relative to larger countries. A close look at the data reveals that, in nearly all the member states, specialisation has increased. In the larger countries, this is the result of strengthening their position in existing strongholds (cars in Germany, machinery in Italy, chemicals in France and food in the United Kingdom). The smaller countries, however, have gained market shares more generally, particularly in some fast growing industries like telecom, medical equipment, but also in some capital intensive industries like basic chemicals and steel.
We have pointed out that these empirical results are broadly in line with a model in economic geography, in which reductions in transport/trading costs lead to higher specialisation and lower concentration. The forces behind this process, in both the model and in our real world case, are roughly the same: large countries have advantages in industries with high economies of scale, with strong demand linkages and importance of inputs. These forces are weakened in open world markets, since a larger share of demand and of inputs come from abroad, and small countries increasingly can exploit given advantages in industries with economies of scale. While we do not argue that this model holds all the answers to the facts we have unearthed, it may be of some value as a 'parable'.
